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FOREWORD
The Federal Tax

Division of the American Institute of Cer

tified Public Accountants believes that the recommendations in

this study are worthy of serious consideration.

The division is

particularly concerned that, although the American public views
social security as a self-funded system similar to a private

annuity, it is not.

The system is a mixture of self-insurance

and government funding that results in significantly different

benefits and burdens for different participant groups.

The di

vision believes that these facts should be made known to the pub

lic and its congressional representatives so that intelligent de

bate is possible, thereby permitting decisions about the true
nature of "social security," and the manner in which its cost
should be allocated.
This study outlines the present nature of the system and

provides suggestions to accomplish specific objectives.

Its

recommendations have been approved by the division's tax policy

subcommittee and have substantial support within the executive
committee of the federal tax division.

In light of the extra

ordinary importance of the social security system and the funda

mental nature of the suggested changes, the executive committee
thought it wise to issue this document for study and comment.
The division hopes that it will stimulate congressional consi
deration, and urge responsible authorities to provide the forum

for free and open discussion.

The division will be prepared to

participate in any reappraisal of social security objectives and

priorities, and it solicits timely submitted comments or sug
gestions regarding it from within the AICPA and from the public

at large.

This study was prepared by the social security task force
of the tax policy subcommittee of the federal tax division.

The

principal author of the study was James E. Wheeler, chairman

of the social security task force.

B. Kenneth Sanden and Donald

H. Skadden, the members of the task force, also made substantial
contributions to the study.

Marie Bareille of the AICPA Publi

cations Division also provided great assistance as editor of

this publication.
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OUR BASIC RETIREMENT SYSTEM - SOCIAL SECURITY:
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

In its fullest sense "social security" should be viewed
as a comprehensive, lifetime system composed of various interre

lated parts.

In one way or another, society must protect itself

from financial disasters.

It needs and wants financial protection

from serious health problems, loss of income due to unemployment
disability, or death of the family "bread-winner," and debilita
ting poverty, and it wishes to provide for retirement income.

In

our present economic and political systems, such a total protec

tion plan should be financed by some combination of governmental
programs, employer programs, private savings, and insurance plans.

In the United States a significant portion of this total protec
tion is provided by employer- and individually-financed insurance
and savings plans.

In addition, the federal, state, and local

governments spend billions of dollars annually in social protec
tion programs, including such things as (1) welfare— including

aid to dependent children (ADC), food-stamps, low-cost public
housing, supplemental security income (SSI) — a guaranteed annual

income plan for low-income persons financed by general revenues, and
many other federal and state welfare programs;

compensation;
care;

(3) disability protection;

(2) unemployment

(4) medicaid and medi

(5) survivorship protection; and (6) retirement benefits.1

1For perhaps the most complete discussion of the many facets
of our social security system, see Robert J. Myers, Social Secu
rity (Homewood Ill.: Richard D. Irwin for McCohan Foundation,
1975).
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This study is concerned primarily with the retirement portion of
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (hereafter, social secu

rity system).
SUMMARY
The recommendations of most observers, including the current
administration and congress, concentrate primarily on the revenue

side of the system and call for constant increases in the payroll

tax.

These taxes have already grown faster than the consumer

price index, increasing by more than 600 percent between 1962
and 1977.

Even after these increases, revenues were inadequate

to support the level of outlays, and, consequently, another huge
increase in social security taxes is scheduled to take effect be
ginning in 1979.

Because these taxes cannot continue to rise at

this rate, our recommendations focus on the benefits taxpayers
should receive from the system.

If adopted, these suggestions would prevent long-term oper
ating deficits for the retirement portion of the social security

system and allow for some reduction in social security taxes.

In addition, these suggestions would significantly simplify and

increase the equity of the system.
Briefly, the recommendations are as follows.
1.

The present stratified benefit computation should be re

placed by an unstratified payment schedule based on price
level-adjusted total contributions to the retirement sys
tem for each individual.
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Total contributions would

include the retirement portion of both the employee and
employer contributions plus a real rate of return.

That

sum would in turn be adjusted for price-level changes.

This would then be the basis for the earned retirement
benefit.

In order to receive the same retirement annui

ty, self-employed persons should contribute an amount

equal to the total amount contributed by both the em
ployee and employer.

This earned computation system would eliminate —
a.

The minimum benefit computation and thus the

problem of "double dipping."
b.

The weighting of benefits or a disproportionate

return on different contribution amounts.
These items presently result in retirement benefits

in excess of the amounts that would be received
based on price-level-adjusted total contributions

to the system and thus, in effect, constitute "wel
fare-type" payments.

2.

The current pay-as-we-go concept should be retained.

There is no need to create a large, actuarially sound
fund with which to meet obligations; however, the absence

of an actuarial investment fund means, in essence, that
the government’s general fund has "borrowed" from the
social security fund.

Subsequent transfers from the

general fund to the social security fund will be neces
sary to "pay back" these borrowed amounts.
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The timing of

such repayments would be influenced by any or all of

the following phenomena:
a.

The inclusion of a price-level adjustment in

the benefit calculation.
b.

The inclusion of a real rate of return in the

benefit calculation.
c.

Dramatic decreases in the ratio of workers to

retirees due either to high unemployment or
to significant demographic changes.
3.

As indicated in the foregoing recommendation, total con
tributions used in calculating retirement benefits should

be periodically adjusted to reflect increases in the con
sumer price index.
This periodic updating for price-level changes

would ensure the relatively constant purchasing power
of the benefit received.

4.

The retirement annuity should begin at age 65 (unless

actuarially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier

age have been elected) regardless of the employment
status of the participants.

If early retirement (prior

to age 65) is permitted, the initial annuity should be

based on contributions up to that retirement date.
Wages after early retirement should be subject to FICA

until age 65, thus requiring an annual recomputation of
the retirement annuity.
Discontinuing the taxation of earnings after age

65 would eliminate all of the inequities in the present
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rules concerning work after that age.

Many persons

have difficulty explaining why individuals who need
additional income should be penalized (subjected to

FICA taxation and loss of social security benefits)
for working, whereas persons with large amounts of
investment income (and thus large equity interests)

collect full social security benefits.

5.

Settlement options selected at time of retirement should
permit (1) a joint and survivor annuity (for married
persons),

(2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity

with a guaranteed refund feature under which the price

level-adjusted total contributions for retirement would
be guaranteed

to either the retiree or the estate.

If

the participant dies before reaching age 65 without a
surviving spouse, the

total price-level-adjusted con

tributions for retirement should be paid to the estate.

If there is a surviving spouse, that person should
generally have the same settlement options permitted

the participant as if the participant had reached re
tirement age.

This would eliminate much of the inequity arising
under the present system when persons are taxed and die

before retirement age without having eligible dependents.
6.

For income tax purposes, the retirement portion of the
FICA tax assessed against employees and self-employed

persons should be deductible when paid, and retirement
benefits should be taxable when received.
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The employer's

contribution should continue to be deductible.

In the

event of a lump-sum distribution under the foregoing
recommendation — because of death before retirement age
or because of the guaranteed refund feature — Congress

should give consideration to some form of income aver
aging, because these amounts would be subject to the

income tax.

7.

The foregoing recommendations would likely increase fu
ture social security retirement benefits for some and

decrease them for others.

If any retirees’ incomes

should drop below established minimums, then they should

be eligible for income assistance under the supplemental
security income (SSI) program, which is financed by
general revenues and based on need.

For present and

near-term retirees, perhaps the current level of scheduled

benefits should be guaranteed without a "needs" test,
but the excess of the amount that they receive over the
amount that they would collect under the earned compu

tation plan should come from the SSI program.

8.

Coverage under social security should be made as uni
versal as possible.

9.

Should Congress desire to retain the present income tax
exclusion for social security benefits, which fails to
benefit low-income retirees, then the exclusion should
be legislatively enacted.

An exclusion of this magni

tude should not be made by administrative decision only.
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The major thrust of these recommendations is that welfare
or the unearned portion of the benefits from the social security

system should be transferred to the general revenue budget.
Welfare should be an expenditure out of the general revenue,
not payroll tax revenue.

This would greatly strengthen the so

cial security system and would simplify its structure.

The re

gressive nature of the payroll tax would then be justified, for
it would be paying only for earned retirement benefits.
This shift of welfare payments from the social security pro

gram should permit a significant reduction in social security
taxes; however, the need for general revenue (primarily from the
income tax) will increase.

The tax reduction for social security

should exceed the needed additional income tax revenue (because

of the implementation of the needs test under the SSI program).

The entire tax reduction in social security should result in re

duced labor costs and increased economic activity that could have
a beneficial effect through reduced unemployment and inflation
and through increased capital formation.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Much of the study leading to the prior recommendations in

volved attempts to develop answers to five very basic questions.

1.

Is the social security system absolutely necessary?

With about 32 million current beneficiaries and

with about 100 million others expecting benefits because
of their current tax payments, there can be little
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doubt that a federal retirement system is absolutely

essential.
2.

Is the social security tax regressive?
The financing of social security is highly re

gressive to moderately low- and middle-income wage
earners because it is a flat rate based only on a

limited amount of earned income.

For very low wage

earners in 1978 ($4/848.48 or less) with dependent

children, the refundable "earned income credit" off
sets the full impact of the FICA tax.

Thus, for this

group, the effective tax rate is zero and therefore not
regressive.

For wage earners between $4,848 and $8,000

with dependent children, the earned income credit offsets

a declining portion of the social security tax, and,
above $8,000, it does not offset any of this tax.
The effective tax rate is also zero for those with very

high income derived solely from investment and is there

fore regressive.

For those with large salaries, the

effective tax rate decreases as earned income increases.

This tax is, thus, regressive when compared to the tax
on the earnings of the average wage earner.

If one views the social security contribution as
the purchase of a retirement plan, then regression should

be inevitable, since regression is the natural result

when low-income persons purchase anything, be it food

or a retirement plan.
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While the regressive nature of

the expenditure should be realized, a retirement system

should not be criticized on that basis.
Thus, to the extent that the social security tax

finances any government activity other than the indivi
dual’s own retirement, it should be acknowledged a re
gressive tax.

To the extent that the social security

contribution is limited to the amount necessary to

finance the individual's own retirement, the concept

of ’’regressivity" is not relevant.
3.

Are the retirement benefits of the social security

system progressive?

Yes, they are very progressive, especially for those
who obtain the so-called minimum benefit or who have

had very low earned incomes.

For those who have had

all of their FICA tax refunded through the earned income

credit, the effect is more than progressive; they get
heavily weighted benefits based, in part, on wages that

were essentially untaxed.
Progression of benefits is one of the things that

is wrong with the system.

Retirement benefits should be

based on what a person has paid into the system.

To the

extent that a beneficiary receives more than what has
been paid for, he is receiving welfare.

And, welfare

payments should not be funded with a regressive payroll
tax.

Regressive taxes favor the upper-income groups,

and progressive welfare benefits favor the low-income
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groups; middle income persons supply the benefits.
4.

What percentage of an individual's retirement income

should social security provide?
The retirement benefits should be whatever amount
has been "paid for" by prior tax payments, but it should

not be so large as to eliminate the need for private
savings.

The exact percentage of necessary retirement

income is difficult to determine; it should, however,

provide a floor of protection for those with normal
working lifetimes and average wages.

5.

Should general tax revenues be used to supplement the
social security system?

If the system actually were a retirement system,
as most people have been led to believe, the answer
would be a resounding No.

General revenue should not be used to supplement

retirement system revenues.

Our present social security

system, however, includes a substantial element of wel

fare that should be removed entirely from the social
security system and shifted to the supplemental security

income (SSI) program, which is purely a welfare program
funded through general revenues.
However, under our present system, it seems logical

that general funds should be transferred to the social
security fund for at least three reasons, two of which

are related to the welfare element discussed above.
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First, the benefits are relatively higher for those at
the lower end of the income scale.

The practical effect

of this is two major groups drawing benefits substan

tially in excess of what would be justified by their

contributions — (1) those who actually earned at the
lower levels through most or all of their working life
times and (2) government employees who are able to take

private-sector jobs just long enough to qualify for so

cial security benefits at the low-income levels.

Both

groups are receiving something that they have not paid
for, which, in essence, is welfare.

This welfare element

should be subjected to a "needs" test and financed by

general revenue funds, not by the regressive payroll tax.
Second, much of the recent short-run deficit in the

system was due to heavy unemployment, and this affects

intergenerational transfers under the pay-as-we-go
system.

The effects of excessive unemployment should

not result in increased tax rates in the retirement

portion of the social security system.

When this happens,

the labor sector is hit twice — once by unemployment
and then by increased social security taxes.

Again, it

would be preferable to make the social security system

truly a retirement system.

In this case, an unemployed

worker who did not contribute to social security would

not receive credit for the period of unemployment.

If

a worker suffered such severe unemployment that his earned
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retirement benefits fell below some minimum standard,

he would be eligible for a welfare payment that would
come from general funds.

Alternatively, if unemployed

workers were given credit for their periods of unem

ployment, then the general fund should, in essence, make
their contributions for them during such period of un
employment.

It would be possible to establish a normal

rate of contributions for unemployed persons.

It would

also be possible to designate a reasonable rate of un
employment; in which case, the general fund would need

to make contributions to the social security fund only
during periods of excessive unemployment.
Third, because the social security taxes are not
deductible when paid, the income taxes paid on the em

ployees’ and self-employeds ’ social security contribu

tion is a form of double taxation.

Thus, in a very real

sense, the social security system is contributing to
the general fund substantial amounts that should be made
available to the system itself.

The amount of such

double taxation is very difficult to measure.

The earned

income credit is a direct offset to the double taxation.

But, even beyond that, it is quite difficult to know to

what degree Congress had modified income tax rates be
cause of the rapid increase in social security taxes.

A much better alternative would be for the social security
system to be taxed in the same way as qualified pension
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plans.

This would require taxation of social security

benefits and deductibility of social security taxes.

Because of the impact of the zero-bracket amount and
the double personal exemptions after age 65, taxability

of benefits would not reduce the income of any individual
whose only income after retirement comes from social
security benefits.

PROBLEMS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH

No benefit percentage is specified in our recommendations.
Instead, it is stated that benefits should relate to price
level-adjusted total contributions.

This would require, in

effect, a breakdown of the contributions in order to determine
how much would be for retirement and survivorship as opposed to
disability.

This would be an extensive actuarial undertaking

and could perhaps be done best by the social security adminis

tration.

The appendix shows several examples of the computation

of price-level-adjusted total contributions.

Logically, social security retirement benefits should reduce

an individual ’s desire for personal savings.

And, each of these —

social security benefits and personal savings — should impact

on the need for welfare such as SSI.

The benefits from social

security should be high enough to be attractive to groups of
federal, state, and local employees and yet not so large as to
eliminate the need for personal savings, including private re

tirement plans.

This, too, is a function of the amount of the

-13-

contribution.

Thus, if the welfare aspects of the present social

security system were shifted to the SSI program, perhaps the

payroll tax rate could be significantly reduced.

This should in

crease personal savings and thus stimulate capital formation.
In addition, in certain situations, capital can be substi

tuted for labor; with social security taxes increasing faster

than the cost of living, the effect on employment is detrimental.

An inability to substitute capital for labor may be particu

larly onerous to certain sectors of the economy, such as nonprofit
entities, including state and local governments.
A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM
The remaining portion of this paper reviews some of the basic

characteristics of the retirement portion of social security,

analyzes some of the financing problems confronting the system,
and develops some recommendations for change.

The present social security system affects most Americans

at some point in their lifetimes.
The number of persons receiving monthly benefits
under the old-age, survivors, and disability in
surance program totaled 31.4 million by the end
of June 1975. An estimated 100 million workers
had earnings in calendar year 1975 that were
taxable and creditable toward (their) benefits
under the program.2

2Board of Trustees, 1976 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, House Document 94-505 (Bal
timore: Social Security Administration, U.S.D.H.E.W., 1976),
p.3.
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In addition to the millions of workers, several million employers
also paid social security taxes.

The figures in the foregoing

quotation indicate that there are currently about three workers
for each beneficiary receiving old-age, survivors, or disability

benefits.

By year 2050 this ratio could decrease to a point where

there could be more retirees than workers.

The chief actuary

of the U.S. Social Security Administration commented in 1976

as follows:
Since 1962 social security taxes have increased
faster than the consumer price index (CPI) and
most recommendations for change call for increased
taxes. Under the current-cost method of financing,
the amount of taxes collected each year is intended
to be approximately equal to the benefits and ad
ministrative expenses paid during the year plus
a small additional amount to maintain the trust
funds at an appropriate contingency reserve
level. The purpose of the trust funds under current-cost financing is to reflect all financial
transactions and to absorb temporary differences
between income and expenditures.3

The desired size of the contingency reserve was recently

reduced from approximately 100 percent of the annual expenditures
to 50 percent, and one recent Carter administration proposal

would have reduced the reserve to about 35 percent of one year’s

3A. Haeworth Robertson, A Commentary Prepared to Assist in
the Reading and Interpretation of the 1976 Trustees Report,
OASDI, p. 1 and A Commentary Prepared to Assist in the Reading
and Interpretation of the 1977 Annual Reports of the Board
of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds (Baltimore: Social
Security Administration, U.S.D.H.E.W., 1976 and 1977), p. 1.
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expenditures based on the added protection of their recommended
countercyclical device.4

In recent years, the social security system has grown enor
mously.

In the 1977 federal budget, the revenue generated by

social security taxes (FICA, medicare, and unemployment) is more
than twice the revenue from the corporate income tax and repre

sents more than one-third of total federal receipts.5

For

millions of Americans, social security taxes are significantly

larger than individual income taxes.6

In comparing the federal budgets for years 1962 and 1977,

social security tax receipts have increased more than 600 percent.

Even with all of this revenue, the system is currently paying
benefits in excess of revenues and will continue to do so until

at least 1979, when the huge increase in FICA tax is scheduled

to begin.

In 1966, by contrast, the social security system re

ceipts were less than the tax yield from the corporate income

tax, and the system was operating with revenues in excess of

benefits.
Obviously, benefits in total have increased even faster

than the rise in social security taxes, even though the increase

4"Statement of HEW Secretary Califano on the Administra
tion’s Social Security Financing Proposal Before the Senate
Finance Subcommittee on Social Security," as reported in the
Daily Report for Executives (Bureau of National Affairs) June
13, 1977, page X-2.

5Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses Budget
of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p.8.
6Ibid., p. 10.
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in FICA taxes has exceeded the increase in the CPI.
From 1937 through calendar year 1976, cumulative
income to the trust funds amounted to $661 bil
lion . . . and cumulative disbursements amounted
to $620 billion. The balance of $41 billion was
held in the trust funds at the end of calendar
year 1976. Based on curr
ent projections (under the
intermediate assumptions ) it is estimated that,
during the calendar years 1977-81, income to the
trust funds will total $499 billion . . . and
disbursements will be $540 billion. This is a
projected decrease in the trust funds of $41
billion during the period 1977-81.7

With all this change, there had to be some adjustments made,
but, unfortunately, the answer was another tax increase in the
recently enacted Social Security Amendments of 1977.
The Basic Retirement Package

In its narrowest sense, social security is security for
retirement even though this is only one part of our "old age,

survivors, disability, and health insurance"

(OASDHI) system.

A mandatory, contributory, retirement system is not only de

sirable, it is essential, because we cannot "back out" and start

anew.

Without such a system, millions of additional low-income

elderly persons would be on public welfare; for the same reason,
it is absolutely necessary that benefits not be eroded by infla
tion.

7Robertson, Commentary Prepared to Assist in the Reading
and Interpretation of the 1977 Annual Reports of the Board of
Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds, p. 2.
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Concepts in Financing the Retirement Package
The American public generally has been convinced that this

universal retirement plan should be paid for by the payroll

tax.

According to this view, payroll tax payments are some

what similar to retirement annuity premiums.

Indeed, most

persons probably see this tax as their investment in their own
future retirement benefits; the current acceptance of our very

high payroll tax may well be attributable to the predominance
of this view.

Alternatively, the payroll tax can be viewed

as just another source of federal revenue — a flat-rate

income tax based solely on a limited amount of earned income.
As just one more source of federal tax revenue, there would be

no need for prior designations of how these funds should be

spent.

Certainly, in this view, there is no need to tie benefits

to contributions or even to have separate funds.

The idea of

using general income tax revenue to supplement the payroll tax

would not exist because both would be considered to be sources
of general revenue.

For example, under this concept, welfare,

defense, or any other payments could be met with the use of pay

roll tax revenues.

This would remove from social security any

pretense of retirement insurance and would emphasize the fact
that such a social security system is simply another form of

welfare.

It is worthwhile to note that our present retirement system
is really a combination of both concepts, even though they are
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quite different.

To the extent the payroll tax is used to aug

ment general revenues (through hidden welfare expenditures),
the American public is being deceived.

In addition, there may

be very serious economic implications.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RETIREMENT UNDER

THE SOCIAL SECURITY PLAN
The principal characteristics of the federal retirement

system are (1) it is compulsory,

(2) it establishes a floor of

protection (a social adequacy concept),

(3) it is self-supporting

via the payroll tax, and (4) it is not a "means" or "needs"

tested program.

There are some significant exceptions to all of

these concepts.
The Compulsory Coverage Concept

The single most important exception to the compulsory
contribution concept is the exclusion of federal (and in some

cases, state and local) employees.

There is a separate re

tirement plan for federal employees (similar in some respects

to private retirement plans), but this is not an adequate
reason for the exclusion of government employees.8

It has been observed that in 1969 one-third
of social security beneficiaries who were

8Robert J. Myers, Social Security, p. 189.
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also receiving benefits under another govern
mental plan were receiving minimum benefits.9

In fact, it appears to us that there is no valid reason for the

exclusion, and, therefore, all governmental employees should
be brought into the system.

This has implications both for the

minimum payment and weighting of benefits, which are discussed
later.

Social Security coverage is generally compulsory only if the
individual has wage or self-employment income.

Investment in

come, such as dividends or interest, is not taxed to provide

for social security.

When a retirement system does not pay any

welfare, this tax exemption is logical because investment in
come continues after retirement (unless the principal is con
sumed) , whereas wages are generally discontinued.

The Social Adequacy (Floor-of-Protection) Concept

Many people believe that society should guarantee every
individual a minimum level of health care and a minimum standard
of living.

To one degree or another, such a welfare concept is

well ingrained in the political and social structure of the
United States today.

Social adequacy is a welfare objective in which
an individual's benefit amount is determined, not
by his or her contributions, but by (a) appropriate

9Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the
Congressional Research Service, Joint Committee Print (Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 24.
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transfer of income from affluent to needy
groups, and (b) a minimum standard of living be
neath which society decides that no individual should
fall. The Social Security Act of 1935 represented
a compromise between equity and social adequacy with
in a system that was designed to build at least a
part of the actuarial reserve that would be neces
sary to fund a comparable privately oriented program.
But amendments to the Act steadily shifted the em
phasis more in the direction of social adequacy by
weakening_the relationship between benefits and contri
butions /emphasis added/.10

It is not necessary nor is it logical that this minimum "social

adequacy" be provided entirely through the social security retire

ment system.

There are a number of ways in which individuals may

provide for their own retirement, including employer pension
plans, Keogh plans, individual retirement accounts, private

annuities, individual savings accounts, and social security.
Most people have viewed social security from the beginning as
a means by which they are providing for their own retirement;
indeed, the government has taken great pains to promote that

notion.

If we do not return to a logical and fiscally responsi

ble relationship between contributions and benefits, the entire

social security retirement system will lose its credibility.
If an individual retiree's retirement income from social security

and other plans, if any, is inadequate, then such income can be
supplemented by the variety of local, state, and federal programs
mentioned earlier.

10Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security, p. 12.
It should be noted that the income transfer is not from the af
fluent but largely from the middle income wage earner.
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Presently we are attempting to provide a major part of

the minimum social adequacy through the social security retire

ment system, via a benefit structure that greatly overweights

the benefits at the low end of the scale.

The minimum monthly

benefit in 1975 was the higher of $101.40 or $9 each year of

covered employment in excess of ten years but not greater than
thirty years.11

Thus, for 1975 the minimum benefit after thirty

years of coverage would be $180 ($9 x 20 years).

family benefit is higher yet.

The minimum

To be eligible for the minimum

benefit, in 1975 an individual must generally have had covered

wages of at least $50 for forty quarters.12

If an individual

had earned only $50 for forty quarters and if a 5.85 percent
rate were in existence for all ten years, the total FICA tax

for the entire ten-year period would be only $117.00 (5.85% x

$50 x 40), and for this amount this person would receive a monthly
benefit of at least $101.40.

Attempting to provide minimum social adequacy through
the social security retirement system creates various social

11Myers, Social Security, p. 59.
U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
12
Social Security Administration, Social Security BulletinAnnual Statistical Supplement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern
ment Printing Office 1974), pp. 11-12. The quarterly earnings
test has been changed slightly by the Social Security Amend
ments Act of 1977. Starting in 1978, to be fully covered,
earnings must generally be $250 for 40 quarters of coverage.
For each $250 of earnings in a year, a worker will get one
quarter of coverage and up to four quarters for annual earnings
of $1,000 or more.
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and financial problems.

When welfare is provided through

retirement payments, it is not practical to subject it to any

sort of "needs" test.

The absence of a "means" test for the

welfare element of social security causes disproportionately

high benefits to be paid to many individuals who have substan
tial incomes from other sources.

Also, it makes it possible,

and often financially attractive, for government employees to

accept covered employment just long enough to qualify for the
minimum social security benefits.
One of the greatest inequities of combining welfare with

social security is that this portion of federal welfare must be
financed entirely by workers covered by social security, whereas

welfare should be financed from the general revenues.

The finan

cial impact of combining welfare and social security is evidenced

by Professor Cohen’s testimony that benefits received but not
paid for by the beneficiaries when they were contributors "ap

proximates about one-third of the long-range costs."13

Thus, we strongly recommend that there be no "minimum
benefit" from the social security retirement system, but that
all benefits be based directly on the individual's own contri

butions to the system and length of employment.

If such bene

fits, plus retirement income from other sources, is below what
ever minimum society establishes, the additional should be pro
vided from a general fund welfare program.

13Professor Wilbur J. Cohen, former HEW Secretary, in
testimony before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Social Se
curity as reported in the Daily Report for Executives (Bureau
of National Affairs) June 16, 1977, p. J-4.
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Professor Cohen suggested another alternative that would

treat the benefits received from federal, state, or local public
retirement or pension plans, which are supplementary to social

security, as being from social security.

Thus, these persons

would receive the higher of the two (if only two) plans but

not both (unless they were fully and continuously covered under

both plans).14

This would be an improvement in the present

system relative to government workers; however, we believe

that our plan corrects many other defects and is, therefore,

preferable.
The Self-supporting Concept

Many persons seek to keep the social security system and

the general revenue system separate.

Robert J. Myers, testi

fying as a former chief actuary, on February 4, 1976, stated
that —
Finally, let me turn to how the financing problems
of the OASDI system should not be solved. Some
people have proposed the solution of injecting a
governmental subsidy from general revenues into
OASDI either directly or else indirectly by moving
some of the Hospital Insurance tax rates to OASDI and
then injecting a government subsidy into HI. This
approach should not be followed for a number of
reasons.

Introduction of a government subsidy would dilute the
awareness of the public as to the cost of the pro
gram, because many would believe that somebody other
than themselves would be providing this financing.

14Cohen, Daily Report for Executives (Bureau of National
Affairs) June 16, 1977, p. J-3.
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In actual fact, the general revenues taxation neces
sary to produce the government subsidy would be paid
by virtually the same people who are now paying the
payroll taxes—and very likely with not too great a
difference in the actual incidence of the taxes.
(Note: Even if this latter assumption were true,
it totally ignores the economic and political impli
cations .)

The injection of general revenues into the timetested approach to the system being wholly selfsupporting from payroll taxes would erode the selfsustaining concept by moving in the direction of a
welfare concept. In turn, this could lead to means
testing for benefits. Any general revenue financing
in OASDI would very likely lead to a lack of stability
in the benefit protection provided because of the
pressures of other programs that can only be financed
from general revenues.15
The injection of general revenues into the social security

system has a counterpart that is almost never mentioned — the

injection of general fund expenditures.

Consistency demands

opposition to the insertion of general revenue expenditures

(welfare) into the social security system that is just as strong

and vigorous as opposition to that system’s use of general
revenues.

Welfare programs are rightly expenditures of general

revenues, not payroll taxes.

Thus, welfare expenditures should

be removed from the social security system or paid for by using
general revenues within the social security system.

We favor

the former.

The social security system is termed "self-supporting," a
concept for which there are at least three possible interpreta-

,

15
Robert
J. Myers, Statement on Behalf of the American Life
Insurance Association on the President’s Social Security Pro
posals Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, February 4, 1976, p. 3-4.
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tions.

At one extreme would be an actuarially sound, fully

funded program comparable to a commercial annuity.

This might be

thought of as "self-supporting" from the point of view of each

separate annuitant.

The funding feature of this program is not

necessary, feasible, nor even desirable for social security:
Full funding of social security would completely upset the entire

economy.

At the other extreme, the entire social security

system is said to be "self-supporting" for any year in which
sufficient payroll taxes are collected to cover that year’s
payments to retirees.

A third concept, which combines certain

features of each of the others, would require that each indi
vidual's benefits be actuarially based upon his contributions and

years of service, but would not require the funding, which,
in essence, means that current contributions would still be

available for payment of part or all of current benefits.

The social security system was really conceived under the

third concept in that there was expected to be a fairly direct
correlation between an individual's retirement benefits and the

amounts of that individual's contributions.

The idea was sold

to the public on that basis, and the government has carefully

maintained this notion of "insurance."

One of the greatest

advantages of an actuarial correlation between contributions

and benefits is the discipline it would place upon Congress

in considering benefit increases.

Unfortunately, Congress has

moved our social security system almost entirely away from

this actuarial relationship, even while it was publicly
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nurturing the idea that the system is still a federal insurance

program.

Without actuarial discipline, Congress has elected

to incorporate an ever increasing share of the federal welfare

program into the social security retirement system.

There are two important aspects relative to the concept
of self-supporting.

First, an actuarial relationship between

contributions and benefits would not preclude the use of general
revenue funds for the payment of retirement benefits.

In fact,

the absence of the funding, which would be a part of a commer

cial system, would require the use of general revenue funds.
In essence, the general revenue funds would provide the interest
factor that would be necessary to produce the actuarially com
puted benefits because, in a very real sense, the government has

"borrowed" all of the retirement contributions.

This amount

would need to be invested in order to produce actuarial benefits

and, therefore, general revenues should pay the interest on such

borrowing.

It is important to note, however, that this would

be an actuarially determined amount of general revenue and would

in no way destroy or even damage the concept of the retirement
system as an insurance program.

Secondly, Congress apparently intends the present social
security retirement system to be self-sustaining on a system

basis without the use of general revenue funding.

The fact is

that income taxes and social security contributions have been

so intermingled on both the revenue and expenditure sides that

today it is almost impossible to determine whether the retire
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ment system is even self-supporting on a system basis.

Even

ignoring for the moment the well-publicized short-fall in social
security revenues, the self-supporting nature of social security
is probably more fiction than fact.

As was pointed out earlier

in this paper, the social security fund contributes to the gen
eral fund by financing a major share of the federal welfare

program.

Also, there are both explicit and implicit trans

fers from the social security fund to the general fund through
the general fund’s borrowing activities.

The present trust fund

balance is invested in government bonds, which are paying sub
stantially below a reasonable market rate of interest.

Also,

as was pointed out earlier, there is an implicit benefit to
the general fund in that there is no attempt to provide an

actuarial funding of social security contributions.

There is

a substantial further implicit transfer of funds from the

social security system to the general fund in that the employee’s
contributions to the retirement system are not deductible for
federal income tax purposes.
Thus, for every dollar contributed to the social security

system, the worker is also paying income tax to the general
fund at his highest marginal income tax rate.

This double

taxation of contributions is usually excused on the basis that

benefits are not taxable.

The double taxation of contributions

is, however, either not offset at all, or is offset in a very

inequitable fashion by the exclusion of social security bene
fits from income taxation.

Due to the zero bracket amount and
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personal exemptions, the exclusion is meaningless for anyone
whose entire retirement income is from social security.
them, the exclusion is worthless.

For

Anyone who dies before re

tirement will have suffered the double taxation of contributions,
but obviously will receive no benefit from the exclusion.

Mil

lions of individuals suffer the double taxation of benefits at
a relatively high marginal rate for thirty or forty years, but

enjoy the exclusion at a much lower rate for a much shorter
period of time.

Beyond even these inequities, the time value

of money would indicate that the cost of the double taxation is

considerably greater than the much later exclusion benefit.
Benefits also flow in the other direction from the general

fund to the social security system.

The refundable "earned

income credit" was enacted in order to reduce the burden of the

FICA tax for the very-low-wage earners.

Thus, workers with

dependent children and incomes below $8,000 contribute to the
social security system but receive a partial or full off set
against their income taxes.

The administration recently pro

posed the extension of the earned income credit to some tax

payers with incomes as high as $20,000.

While ignoring social

security in his welfare reform proposals, President Carter has
proposed income tax reductions in 1978 that would at least

partially offset the burden of the necessary increases in so
cial security taxes.

If carried out, this will further inter

twine the two systems.
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The Means-Test Concept
A "means" test may be applied either at the point of contri

bution or at the time benefits are received, although a pure
retirement system would not need a means test applied at either
stage.

The social security retirement system has a form of

means test at both the contribution and benefit stages.

Perhaps the best example of a hidden means test, at the
point of contribution, is contained in the $400 refundable
earned income credit enacted in 1975.16

While credit is given

on the income tax return, its justification was to relieve
low-wage earners with dependent children of some of the heavy
burden of the FICA tax.

If a person has a steady $4,000 salary

each year, the average monthly taxable wage for FICA purposes
would be $333.33.

This would currently produce a monthly social

security retirement benefit of $247.62, giving this person an

income replacement ratio of 74.29 percent ($247.62

$333.33).

It should be noted that in 1978 the $400 credit exceeds the

$242 FICA tax on $4,000 (6.05% x $4,000) by $158; thus, an

individual with only $4,000 in annual wage income is, in effect,

relieved of the entire employee FICA tax plus $158 of income tax
and still retains all of the heavily weighted benefits for

low-income wage earners.

With no tax paid there can be no

earned retirement benefits, only welfare.

16Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 43.
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This may be a most

desirable thing for a low-income wage earner, but it is welfare,

funded by a payroll tax on other workers, not a paid-for re
tirement package.

As discussed elsewhere in this study, on the benefits side

there is a very real "means" test applied through the variable
replacement ratio,

which

gives the heavily weighted benefits to

the lower-income workers.

THE BENEFIT STRUCTURE
In articles and congressional testimony, many persons have
restricted most of their recommendations to the revenue side of

the system.

With the tremendous growth in revenues, however,

it appears that most of the problems with the system really

involve the benefit side.

Benefits have increased faster than

the revenues, even though revenues have risen faster than the
CPI.

Before presenting our benefit structure recommendations for

changing the retirement system, let us review both the present
computation scheme and the one that will become effective in
1979 .
The Present Benefit Formula

Except when the minimum benefit rules apply, retirement

benefits are now based on the computation of an average monthly
taxable wage usually covering only the nineteen highest years

of taxable wages earned since 1951.

Starting in 1979, the num

ber of years included will increase each year.
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Once the average

monthly taxable wage is determined, it is stratified into seven

predetermined layers to which specified benefit precentages are

then applied in calculating the primary insurance amount (PIA).
The benefit percentages vary from 145.90 percent on the lowest

stratum to 24.34 percent on the highest.

The percentages, how

ever, do not decrease uniformly as one might expect them to do.

In fact, they vary somewhat irrationally, with the rate de
clining through the first three strata and then increasing for
the fourth layer followed by decreases through the subsequent

strata.

In addition, the layers or strata of the average monthly

taxable wage are not equal; they vary in an irregular pattern

from $290 to $100.

This is demonstrated in the table on the

following page, where the average benefit percentage is 46.42
percent ($638.28 ÷ $1,375).
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Table I
Effective Benefit Table as of June 1977

Strata of Average
Monthly Taxable Wage

Percent*

Average Monthly
Benefit or Primary
Insurance Amount ***

$110

145.90

$160.49

Second

290

53.06

153.87

Third

150

49.58

74.37

Fourth

100

Fifth

100

58.30
32.42

58.30
32.42

27.02

67.55

24.34

91.28

First

250
Seventh__ 375**
Sixth

Total

$638.28

$ 1 ,375

x 12
Total
Taxable
Wages in
1977
$16 ,500
*Each percentage increased 5.9 percent over the previous year
when the highest percentage was 137.77 and lowest percentage
was 22.98.

**Increased $100 over the previous year. When this $100 is mul
tiplied by twelve months, it equals the $1,200 increase in tax
able wages or the increase from $15,300 for 1976 to $16,500
for 1977. For 1978, this amount increased to $17,700.
***The 1977 benefit formula was selected so that the effects
of the automatic increases in both the monthly taxable wage
base and the percentage figure could be reflected.

Note: The increases in benefit percentages (based on CPI) and
in taxable wages (based on increases in average wages) are the
results of the 1972 amendments and result in a double adjust
ment for inflation for current workers.
Source: U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, So
cial Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin—Annual
Statistical Supplement, 1974 p. 19 and U.S., Senate, Committee
on Finance, Staff Data and Materials Relating to Social Security
Financing, 95th Cong., 1st sess., June, 1977, p. 5.
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Practically speaking, it is not possible for an individual to

receive the indicated maximum benefit of $638.28.

As shown

above, that maximum would require an average taxable wage of
$16,500 per year, and, for all years prior to 1977, the maxi

mum taxable amount was less than $16,500.

Thus, no individual

retiring in 1977 had an average monthly taxable wage equalling

$1,375.

On an average monthly taxable wage of $687.50

half of the maximum), the benefit would be $459.19

(one-

($110 x

145.90% + $290 x 53.06% + $150 x 49.58% + $100 x 58.3% + $37.50

x 32.42%).

If, an average monthly taxable wage of the full

$1,375 were possible, the second $687.50 of wages would have

generated an additional benefit of only $179.09 [($100 $37.50) x 32.42% + $250 x 27.02% + 375 x 24.34%_7 or $638.28 -

$459.19.

This is about 39 percent of the benefit generated

by the first half of taxable wages.
Significant 1972 Amendments
Two important changes were made in the benefit structure
in 1972.

Under the first, benefits are adjusted automatically

for increases of 3 percent or more in the CPI.

This was the

cause of the 5.9 percent increase in the benefit percentage
noted in Table I.

Under the second change, there is an auto

matic increase in the maximum taxable wage (to the nearest

$300 multiple) as average taxable wages rise (based on taxable
wages of the first quarters of the two prior years).

This

automatic increase is also reflected in the prior table as
-34-

the maximum table wage base increased from $15,300 to $16,500,
($17,700 as of January 1, 1978).

While automatic adjustments due to changes in the CPI
are desirable, the present dual benefit is not justified for

many current workers.

Wages rise in response to inflation,

and, as taxable wages increase, the related future social se

curity benefits also expand.

Then, when the benefit percentages

also increase in response to the CPI, there is a dual benefit.

This has been discussed thoroughly by many persons and suggestions

have been made for uncoupling this unintended dual benefit.1
7
Commissioner of Social Security James B. Cardwell, has recently
stated--

The trustees note that about half of the long
term financing deficit can be eliminated by cor
recting the overindexing of benefits that arises
from the 1972 legislation creating automatic
cost-of-living increases. The overindexing has
the long-range effect of raising social security
benefits to levels at which they would replace
a far greater percentage of a worker’s final
earnings than they now do. In some cases, future
benefits would even exceed pre-retirement earnings.18

17See Colin D. Campbell, Over-Indexed Benefits—The Decoup
ling Proposals for Social Security, and Robert S. Kaplan, Finan
cial Crises in the Social Security System. Both are 1976 Domes
tic Affairs Studies of the American Enterprise Institute for Pub
lic Policy Research, Washington, D.C.; see also 1976 Annual Re
port of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survi
vors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 118, and
Reports of the Advisory Council on Social Security as reprinted
in the Daily Report for Executives Special Supplement (Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C.), No. 46, March 7,
1975, pp. 8-10.
18"Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell, Commissioner of So
cial Security,” (Press briefing May 24, 1976, on reports of the
trustees of the social security trust funds), BNA no. 101, May
24, 1976, p. X-1.
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Decoupling or stabilization of replacement ratios was a signi
ficant part of the Social Security Amendments of 1977.

Post-1978 Years19

Starting January 1, 1979, the seven-strata formula will be
replaced by one using only three strata.

For 1979 these strata

are scheduled as follows.20
Benefit
Percentage

Averaged Indexed
Monthly Earnings
First $180

90

965

32

Excess over $1,085

15

Next

Thus, the new three-strata formula removes the illogical increase
in the benefit percentage in the fourth stratum of the present

formula, and it also temporarily reduces the benefit percentage
for the first stratum to below 100 percent.

The new structure,

with benefit percentages ranging from 90 percent down to 15
percent, does nothing to improve the logical actuarial relation
ship between total contributions and benefits received.

The new formula is largely a response to the need for de

coupling.

Benefits are to be based on average indexed monthly

earnings.

To index, each prior year’s taxable wage is multi

plied by the ratio of the average covered wages of all workers

19For an analysis of the 1977 changes see Colin D. Campbell,
The 1977 Amendments to the Social Security Act (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978).
20Social Security Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-216, sec.201(a).
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for "the year" (two years before the worker reached age 62) to
the average covered wages of all workers in the year being

indexed.

For example, if the average covered wages were $6,000

in 1960 and were $18,000 two years before the retiring worker
reached age 62, and, if he had covered wages of $5,000 in 1960
(the year being indexed), the $5,000 would be increased to

$15,000 for purposes of calculating the average indexed monthly
earnings.

Thus, as wages rise each year, the average indexed

monthly earnings for each past year will also rise.
In addition, as covered wages rise, the amounts in the three
For example, if covered wages in

strata will also increase.

crease 10 percent, the three strata for the following year would

be increased by 10 percent.

This was done so that persons

would not be pushed into higher strata where the benefit per

centages are lower.

Thus, the strata can change annually for current workers
while the benefit percentages remain unchanged.

The average

indexed monthly earnings for retired workers will already have
been determined and will not change, but their benefit percen
tages will increase, as under the 1972 amendments, in response

to increases in the CPI.

The separate treatment of current

workers and retired workers resulted from the elimination of the
double indexing error in the 1972 amendments.

In addition to these changes, the maximum taxable wage is

scheduled to increase from $17,700 for 1978 to $29,700 by 1981.
In addition, the combined employer and employee rate is scheduled
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to increase from 12.1 percent in 1978 to 13.3 percent in 1981.
The combined maximum tax payment will increase from the present
$2,142 to $3,950.

This is a scheduled increase of 84.4 percent

in this three-year period in the maximum tax payment.
The large increase in taxable wage base means increases

in future benefits which probably will result in less private

savings.

The increased benefits, when combined with the expected

decreases in the worker-to-retiree ratio, will also result in

the system's operating in a deficit position at the turn of the

century.

Thus, one of the largest tax increases ever imposed is

but a short-term solution to the current deficit situation.

Changing Birth Rates

Even with the enacted form of decoupling, there are still
long-run problems in funding of social security benefits, as

indicated by Table II.
The information in Table II is based on assumptions of

continued low birth rates not completely offset by other factors

such as more women entering the work force, increased numbers

of immigrants, later retirements, and so forth.

Regardless of

the relative size of the birth rates in different decades, it
is unjust to force one generation, because they happen to have

been born in a period of declining birth rates, to pay more

for their ultimate retirement than preceding or succeeding
generations.

If our primary recommendation were adopted and

benefits were based actuarially on contributions, this would not

-38-

-391.91
6.85
15.14
7.96

9.90
11.10
11.90

10.97

18.93

2.16
3.51
6.09
9.39
14.13
15.55
16.69

.88%
.78

(4)

11.81
17.95
27.04

10.78%
10.68
12.06
13.41
15.99
21.29
26.03
27.45
28.59

9.90%
9.90
9.90
9.90
9.90
11.90
11.90
11.90
11.90

(3)

(2)

itures

4.28

3.68

3.04
7.74

1.68
3.81
7.40

1.95
2.66
3.79
4.94
7.49
7.45
7.35

.77

.88%

(6)

Excess of ex
penditures
over taxes if
replacement
ratios are
held constant

.23

2.30
4.45
6.64
8.10
9.34

.00%
.01
.21
.85

(5)

Portion of excess
in column (4)
attributable to
increase in
replacement ratios

*A. Haeworth Robertson,

A Commentary Prepared to Assist in the Reading and Interpre
tations of the 1976 Trustees Report , OASDI, p. 14.

25-year averages:
1976-2000
2001-2025
2026-2050
75-year average:
1976-2050

1976
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050

(1)

Calendar Year

Tax
rate
in law

Expend

Excess of
expendi
tures
over
taxes

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES AND TAXES FOR OLD-AGE,
SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE SYSTEM UNDER PRESENT LAW AS PERCENT
OF TAXABLE PAYROLL FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1976-2050 BASED ON INTERMEDIATE ASSUMPTIONS*

Table II

present a problem.

If such actuarial relationship is not es

tablished, however, we recommend that any time the ratio of

employed-to-retired falls below a fixed level--perhaps three
workers for each retired person—general fund revenues should

be used to make up the short-fall.

Unearned benefits, inflation, changing birth rates, and un
employment have been principal causes of the gloomy predictions

for social security.

Therefore, we also recommend use of gen

eral revenues to replace the FICA taxes (less reduced benefits)
lost due to excessive unemployment.

High unemployment levels

provide no justification for increases in payroll taxes; it

seems only fair that under the current system the loss of social

security funds due to excessive unemployment, say something

above 5 percent to 6 percent, be made up out of general revenue.
The short-term problem is caused by combined infla
tion and unemployment. Since social security bene
fits are, by law, tied to the Consumer Price Index,
the relatively high rates of inflation of the past
two years have caused higher expenditures for social
security benefits than can be supported by the present
tax structure, while the high levels of unemployment
have meant less income to the trust funds through the
payroll tax.21
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT
It has long been assumed that only individuals pay taxes.

In other words, all corporate taxes are ultimately borne by in
dividual investors, suppliers, consumers, or workers.

21"Briefing Notes for James B. Cardwell," p. 2.
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There

is no reason to believe that the employer portion of the social

security tax is different.
it is passed on to someone.

When a corporation incurs this cost,

Both the gross wages of

the em

ployee (which includes the employees' share of the FICA tax),
and the employer's share of FICA are included in the employer's

cost of doing business.

Both are included in the total labor

cost and, if the employer is a taxable entity, are deductible

for federal income tax purposes.

Thus, if the employer is a

taxable entity, a portion of any FICA tax increase may be passed
on to the government through the tax deduction, but the remainder
must be recovered from customers through price increases or
compensated for by reduced payments to other parties such as

the stockholders, suppliers, or workers themselves.

If the em

ployer is a nonprofit entity, the entire FICA tax must be passed

on or levels of operation must be reduced.

This increased cost of labor may normally result in higher
wage demands and prices as well as increased unemployment.

In

our current economic situation of high unemployment and infla
tion, any additional FICA tax that would tend to spur both un
employment and inflation should be avoided.

In fact, a reduc

tion in such a tax in stagflation periods would be highly de
sirable .

Where business sets prices by a fixed percentage mark
up over costs, a rise in payroll taxes will raise the
prices of goods and services in the short run be
cause employers will view such tax increases as in
creases in their labor costs. Increases in payroll
taxes may, therefore, contribute to inflation. In
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addition, since the rise in prices reduces consumer
real income, total consumer demand will decline in
real terms and this will reduce production and em
ployment. Therefore, rising payroll taxes may be one
source of stagflation, as the simultaneous presence
of inflation and high unemployment has come to be
called.
Computer simulation studies conducted by the staff
compared the effect of a rise in employer payroll
taxes with an equal increase in the personal income
tax. The simulations showed that the payroll tax, if
shifted forward, reduced employment by twice as much
as an equivalent increase in the personal income tax.
Moreover, the payroll tax increase raises the rate
of inflation in the short run, whereas the income
tax increase tends to lower it.22

In the manufacturing sector, there is of necessity a balance
between the cost of equipment and the cost of labor.

While it

is absolutely necessary to have capital to employ labor in our
economy, it is possible to replace labor with equipment.

This

substitution of one for the other should be made whenever the

after-tax cost of one is lower than that of the other.
There are other areas in our economy, however, that are

highly labor intensive, where substitution of equipment is not
really feasible; examples of this would include the professional

firms of attorneys and CPAs and also nonprofit organizations,
such as state and local governmental units, hospitals, and uni
versities .

The last group,

universities, has had great difficulty

in coping with inflation and, as a consequence, real wages

22U.S., Senate, Committee on the Budget, Economic Recovery
and Financing of Social Insurance, Committee Print (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 5-6.
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of their employees have been decreasing.

In addition, for any

increase in the FICA tax there must be an equal increase in

revenues just to break even, for there is no income tax benefit
from a deduction of the employer’s half of the FICA tax nor

for the expected increases in employee wages.

Thus, any increase

in social security taxes to meet rising welfare costs within
the social security system is extremely detrimental to the en

tire covered nonprofit sector of our economy.

It should also

be noted that the use of an income tax credit to reduce employer’s

social security costs, one of the Carter administration proposals,

does nothing for the nonprofit sector unless it is a totally
refundable credit.

As stated before, welfare obligations should not be paid

for with a regressive payroll tax; welfare is an obligation
for general revenue sources.

While we should not put general

revenues into the social security system, we should likewise

not put general fund obligations into that system.

But this

is exactly what we are doing—paying for welfare with a regres

sive tax on labor—and its implications for the well-being of
most of our not-for-profit institutions, state and local govern
ments, and labor-intensive industries generally, could be very
serious.

THE USE OF GENERAL REVENUES IN THE SOCIAL
SECURITY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

If the system we have outlined had always been in exis
tence, it would seldom need any assistance from the general
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revenue fund; there would exist a significant fund from which

to pay retirement obligations.

The system should be self-

supporting except when certain extraneous factors affect either

benefits or financing.
1.

Because these funds are loaned to general revenue and

because of the pay-as-we-go system of intergenerational

transfers, the payroll tax fund could become insuffi

cient whenever a high level of unemployment exists for

an extended period of time.

In this case, it is rec

ommended that general fund revenues be used to supple
ment or, in other words, to make up the short-fall

in current payroll tax revenue.

In fact, this could

be viewed not as tapping general revenues but instead,
as the general fund repayment of borrowed payroll tax

revenues if the beneficiaries’ payments were based
on their contributions.

2.

Again, due to the intergenerational transfer system,

demographic changes can cause a short-fall in current
payroll tax revenues.

Thus, it is recommended that

if the ratio of workers to retired persons falls be

low a fixed point, for example three-to-one, that the
short-fall in payroll tax revenue be made up from gen

eral revenues.
3.

Our recommendations would require the general fund to

reimburse the payroll retirement fund for the real
rate of return plus the inflation factor.
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Since

price-level-adjusted total contributions require an
inflation adjustment plus a real rate of return, this
amount should be charged to the general fund for its

use of these funds even when the Treasury could borrow

at a lesser rate.

The appendix contains some examples

of our suggested computation of the price-level-adjusted

total contribution.
Any major reform of the social security system should include

a re-examination of at least two other characteristics of the

present arrangement.

From the very inception of social security,

contributions have been extracted only from earned income.
This was justified on the assumption that investment income

would continue after retirement.
validity.

This justification has limited

One of the fundamental concepts of social security

has been a forced savings program whereunder individuals are
expected to provide at least a basic floor of protection for
themselves.

This would be better fulfilled if all income con

tributed to such "forced savings."

Thus, if society determines

that a certain floor of retirement income, disability protec
tion, survivorship benefits, and health care is determined to
be essential for every individual, the investors should provide

that floor of protection for themselves as well as workers.

Also, wage earners with some investment income might be expected
to "save" part of their total income.

To the extent that in

vestment income did continue through periods of disability or
into retirement, it would simply supplement the basic floor of

protection.
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Another characteristic of the present system, the benefit
reductions due to income earned after retirement, has been sub
jected to vigorous criticism within Congress and elsewhere.

Many people consider it strange and highly inequitable that
retirees who desire to supplement their social security pensions
with part-time employment find those pensions reduced or elimi
nated when employment income reaches a fairly modest level.

To

find that this earned income reduces retirement benefits and
is still subject to double taxation (FICA and income tax) does
seem to constitute a gross inequity.

One of the nation’s

largest newspapers, in a recent editorial labeled this as the

"...most serious inequity of social security...." and summarized
the widely-held popular notion of social security as follows.

Americans perceive social security, for which large
sums are extracted from their paychecks, as the na
tion's primary pension plan. They see it as something
they have earned, not as charity. They feel that
their earnings after retirement should not impair
their vested interest in that pension plan.
If our primary recommendation were adopted, and benefits

were truly based upon contributions, the notion expressed above

would be accurate, and there should be no earnings offset

against those benefits.

This is another problem of social

security that is compounded by the fact that substantial wel
fare has been incorporated into the social security retirement

system.

Under our present arrangement, which combines earned

benefits with welfare, it is unfair to reduce the earned bene

fits at any level of income, and unfair to continue the welfare

benefits for those with substantial incomes from any source—
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earnings or investments.

Even with today's "mixed bag" it

would be possible at the time each individual reaches social
security retirement age to compute the price-level-adjusted

total contributions by and for that individual.

Also, the pen

sion justified by that total contribution figure could be cal

culated.

Earnings after retirement should never reduce this

earned retirement income.

However, social security benefits

above this amount (really welfare) should be offset by both

earnings and investment income.
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APPENDIX
Price-Level-Adjusted Total Contributions
The following examples show the computation of the total con

tributions from which to calculate monthly retirement bene
fits for

any given individual under various lengths of working lifetimes
and various inflation rates.

In each case, it is assumed that

both the employee and the employer contribute $700 annually to the
system and that these amounts earn a real rate of return of 3 per
cent.

These examples are intentionally oversimplified in that

they are based on a constant annual contribution and on uniform
rates of inflation •

Example 1
Years of work

10

20

30

40

Inflation rate

-0-

-0-

-0-

-0-

Real rate of
return

__3%

_3%

_3%

_3%

_3%

_3%

3%

_3%

Total
Future value of
annuity of $1
at 3%

$11.46388

$26.87037

$47.57542

$75.40126

Annual employee
retirement
contribution

700

700

700

700

$ 8,025

$18,809

$33,303

$ 52,781

8,025

18,809

33,303

52,781

$16,050

$37,618

$66,606

$105,562

Equal amount
for employer’s
contribution
Base from which
to calculate
retirement
benefits (pricelevel-adjusted
total contribu
tions)
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Example 2

40

30

20

10

Years of work
Inflation rate

7%

7%

7%

7%

Real rate
of return

3

3

3

3

Total

10%

10%

10%

10%

Future value of
an annuity of $1
$15.93742
at 10%

$57.27500

$164.4940

$442.5926

Combined annual
employee/employer retirement
contribution

1,400

1,400

1,400

1,400

Base from which
to calculate re
tirement bene
fits

$22,312

$80,185

$230,292

$619,630

Because it is progessively more difficult to retain the

real rate of return as inflation increases, we would recommend
a one-tenth reduction in the real rate of return for every full

percentage point of inflation up to 10 percent.

Thus with in

flation rates at 10 percent or above, there would be a zero

real rate of return.

Reworking Example 2 under this assump

tion produces the results shown on the following page.
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Years of work

10

20

30

40

Inflation rate

7%

7%

7%

7%

Real rate
of return

3

3

3

3

Adjustment to
real rate
of return
Total

Rounded to

-2.1

-2.1

-2.1

-2.1

7.9%

7.9%

7.9%

7.9%

8.0%

8.0%

8.0%

8.0%

Future value of
an annuity of
$1 at 8%

14.48656

45.76196

Combined annual
employee/employer retirement
contribution

$ 1,400

Base from which
to calculate re
tirement, bene
fits

$20,281
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113.2832

259.0565

$ 1,400

$

$

$64,067

$158,596

1,400

1,400

$362,679

